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Abstract 
Competition between scientific hypotheses is not always a matter of mutual 
exclusivity. Consistent hypotheses can compete to varying degrees either directly or 
indirectly via a body of evidence. We motivate and defend a particular account of hypothesis 
competition by showing how it captures these features. Computer simulations of Bayesian 
inference are used to highlight the limitations of adopting mutual exclusivity as a simplifying 
assumption to model scientific reasoning, particularly due to the exclusion of hypotheses that 
may be true. We end with a case study demonstrating the subtleties involved in hypothesis 
competition in scientific practice. 
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1. Introduction 
In formal philosophy of science, certain simplifying and idealizing assumptions are often 
required in order to make questions tractable.  The problem is that such assumptions can also 
get in the way, confounding results derived from our formal models.  Results are confounded 
when they depend upon a part of the model that does not accurately portray the target.  Here 
is a simple, toy example:  even an ornate, highly detailed model of Cathédrale Notre-Dame 
de Paris will not represent every crack, patch, and cranny in the structure’s brick walls.  To 
conclude from this model that the actual Cathedral’s bricks are somewhat glossy and smooth 
would be a mistake; an idealized feature of the model will have confounded your “results” 
should you conclude this. 
The nature of the idealizing assumption(s) made by one’s formal model naturally 
depends on the case.  However, it is striking how often one particular idealizing assumption 
shows up (implicitly or explicitly) in formal philosophy of science, namely, the assumption 
that competing scientific hypotheses are mutually exclusive.  This assumption is the subject 
of our paper. 
Many philosophers of science may not think of this as an idealizing assumption.  
They might think that this feature of a formal model gets the target right—at least often 
enough for it not to be a worrisome confounder.  We accordingly argue in Section 2 that 
competition is often not a simple matter of mutual exclusivity.  If the mutual exclusivity 
assumption has an appropriate general place in formal philosophy of science then, it is as a 
simplifying assumption allowing questions about competing hypotheses to be tractable, not 
as an accurate portrayal of reality.  Highlighting the various ways in which consistent 
hypotheses may compete allows us to uncover two desiderata for a fuller and more accurate 
explication of hypothesis competition.  In Section 3, we use these two desiderata to motivate 
and defend a particular formal explication of hypothesis competition.  In Section 4, we use 
computer simulations and this formal explication to explore the extent to which, and 
conditions under which, this idealizing assumption can confound work in formal philosophy 
of science.  We focus on the particular case of the study of Bayesian inference and its 
reliability.  In Section 5, we turn briefly to a case study to highlight further the need for a 
more careful treatment of hypothesis competition in the philosophy of science.  We suggest 
that our explication provides the formal philosopher of science with a far more useful and 
accurate representation of what it takes for hypotheses to compete in actual scientific 
practice. 
 
2. Desiderata for Hypothesis Competition 
Competition between scientific hypotheses is very often not a matter of mutual exclusivity.  
It is easy to find actual cases of consistent scientific hypotheses being treated as competitors.  
There are two distinct ways in which consistent hypotheses may compete, each suggestive of 
senses in which a satisfactory account of hypothesis competition must part from the simple 
mutual exclusivity idea. 
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First, hypotheses that are not strictly speaking mutually exclusive may still do much 
to directly rebut each other; they may be logically consistent even if they nearly rule each 
other out.  To give a simple example, a detective might judge it very unlikely that Smith and 
Jones carried out the robbery together because he knows they are sworn enemies. The upshot 
is that hypotheses may compete to varying degrees corresponding (at least in this case) to the 
extent that they disconfirm one another—how close they come to entirely ruling each other 
out. This gives rise to our first desideratum: 
 
Desideratum 1.  Hypothesis competition is a matter of degree. 
 
 Second, hypotheses may compete with one another, even in cases where they are not 
only consistent but perfectly compatible or even supportive of one another.  There is no 
direct conflict between them in such a case, but they may nonetheless compete indirectly, via 
some body of evidence.  Hypotheses compete in this way to the extent that adopting either 
hypothesis undermines the support that the relevant body of evidence provides for the other. 
As an illustration of this from science, consider the ongoing debates about the mass 
extinction at the Cretaceous-Paleogene (K-Pg) boundary which brought an end to the 
dinosaurs around 66 million years ago.  The leading hypothesis is the occurrence at this time 
in history of a bolide impact (Alvarez et al. 1980; Schulte et al. 2010); but other contending 
hypotheses include massive volcanism, climate change, and sea level regression.  Overall, a 
vast number of further hypotheses have been proposed (Benton 1990).  Cleland (2002, 2011) 
argues that historical science proceeds by i) the proliferation of rival hypotheses to explain a 
puzzling body of traces, and ii) a search for a ‘smoking gun’ to discriminate between them.  
Many scientists claim that evidence relating to the K-Pg boundary—including the iridium 
anomaly and the existence of impact ejecta such as shocked quartz and spherules, as well as 
the discovery of the Chicxulub crater on the Yucatan peninsula in Mexico
 
(Hildebrand et al. 
1991) and evidence that ejecta at K-Pg boundary sites show a distribution pattern related to 
the distance from the crater (Schulte et al. 2010)—provide a smoking gun for the impact 
hypothesis. 
Without considering the indirect pathway to competition, one might legitimately be 
led to question whether any of these hypotheses are really rivals (or competitors) at all—as 
Cleland’s approach requires.  Certainly there is no logical incompatibility between the 
hypotheses mentioned above; any philosopher of science who explicates competition simply 
as mutual exclusivity will not be accurately representing this feature of the scientific debate.
1
  
                                                     
1
 It is easy to think of distinct hypotheses, parallel to the above, that would be mutually 
exclusive.  For example, instead of simply positing the historic occurrence of a bolide 
impact, massive volcanic activity, etc., parallel hypotheses might state that the primary cause 
of mass extinction at the K-Pg boundary was bolide impact, or volcanic activity, etc.  The 
primary cause could not be more than one of these events, and so one might argue that 
competition in this case really does come down to mutual exclusivity.  We think this 
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But note that hypotheses such as impact and volcanism are also not plausibly thought of as 
direct competitors at all. It is much more reasonable to treat them as independent before any 
evidence is taken into account since plausibly they do little or nothing to rebut each other 
directly to any significant degree.
2
  Rather, insofar as there is competition between these 
hypotheses, it comes indirectly by way of the body of evidence for which they both 
individually claim to account.  
The upshot is that a full account of hypothesis competition needs to take into account 
two different ways in which scientific hypotheses can compete.  Figure 1 provides a visual 
representation of the two distinct “pathways to hypothesis competition.”  Solid lines with 
arrows represent logical (deductive or inductive) relationships between propositions.  In (a), 
the absence of an arrow between H1 and H2 means that there is no direct support or 
disconfirming relation between these hypotheses.  This means that H1 and H2 can only 
compete indirectly via E as indicated by pathway 1.  In (b), H1 and H2 have a direct bearing 
on one another and so they may also compete directly if pathway 2 describes a disconfirming 
rather than supporting relation.  
The foregoing discussion gives rise to our second desideratum: 
 
Desideratum 2.  There are two pathways to hypothesis competition: a direct pathway and 
an indirect pathway via the evidence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
argument would be misguided for many reasons, including the following two:  (1) So stated, 
the hypotheses imply the occurrence of the explanandum (the mass extinction), and so they 
all account maximally well for the explanandum in this sense.  However, the hypotheses that 
scientists actually have in mind in this case are evaluated for how well they support the 
explanandum, some being perceived as more or less capable of accounting for the mass 
extinction.  (2) While these parallel, mutually exclusive hypotheses surely do compete, it 
remains the case that the original, consistent hypotheses we (and working scientists) have in 
view can also clearly compete—for one thing, they can do so when they undermine each 
other’s evidential support.  By replacing consistent competing hypotheses with parallel, 
mutually exclusive hypotheses, we are ignoring—not illuminating—the notion of hypothesis 
competition at work in such cases. 
2
 Later we will draw attention to some recent work suggesting a positive dependence. 
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Figure 1.  In (a), H1 and H2 may only compete indirectly via Pathway 1; in (b), H1 and H2 
have the potential to compete directly via Pathway 2 or indirectly via Pathway 1. 
 
 
3. Direct and Indirect Competition 
In (Glass and Schupbach 2017), we develop and defend a formal explication of hypothesis 
competition that satisfies both of the above desiderata.  In this section, we motivate the use of 
this measure explicitly in terms of direct and indirect pathways to competition and we 
reiterate some important implications of competition explicated in this way. 
Our explication is Bayesian only in the sense that it is probabilistic, and uses the 
relevant probabilities as formal representations of rational degrees of belief (or credences) for 
a particular epistemic agent.  Since these are probabilities, they are assumed to satisfy the 
standard Kolmogorov axioms; rational agent credences are thus at least synchronically 
coherent in our framework.  Setting up our minimal Bayesian framework, if A is an algebra 
of propositions (including the tautology and closed under negation and disjunction), then 
probability function Pr: A→[0,1] assigns the degrees of belief that an ideal Bayesian agent 
has in any and all members of A.  The degree to which one proposition (incrementally) 
confirms another is measured differently by distinct candidate measures.  Our favored 
measure is the “log-likelihood” measure (and other measures ordinally equivalent to it).  For 
any three propositions x, y, z ∈ A, this measure calculates the degree to which x confirms y, 
given z, as follows: 
Cl(x,y|z) = log [
Pr(x|y&z)
Pr(x|¬y&z)
] 
The degree to which proposition x disconfirms y, given z, on the other hand is defined as the 
degree to which x confirms ¬y, given z: 
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Cl(x,¬y|z) = log [
Pr(x|¬y&z)
Pr(x|y&z)
] = −Cl(x,y|z) 
Using Cl, our measure of the overall (or “net”) degree to which H and Hʹ compete 
with respect to E may be represented as the average degree to which H and Hʹ disconfirm 
each other in light of E: 
 
Comp(H,H'/E) = [Cl(H,¬H'|E)+Cl(H',¬H|E)]/2 
 
Comp takes increasingly positive values to the extent that H and Hʹ compete (or disconfirm 
one another in light of E), decreasingly negative values to the extent that H and Hʹ support 
(or confirm) one another, and value 0 exactly when H and Hʹ are irrelevant to one another in 
light of E (this happens, e.g., when the direct and indirect competition or support between H 
and Hʹ with respect to E exactly cancel each other out).3 
We may demonstrate that Comp captures both pathways to competition by showing 
that it is a simple combination of separate measures of degree of direct and indirect 
competition respectively.  Recall that competition between hypotheses H and Hʹ (where H, 
Hʹ ∈ A) occurs along the direct pathway to the extent that these hypotheses confirm the 
falsity of each other (i.e., “disconfirm” each other).  In our previous paper, we used degree of 
disconfirmation Cl(H
′,¬H) to represent the degree to which Hʹ directly rebuts H and used 
this as part of our account of competition. Here we extend this by using Cl to formalize 
degree of direct competition Comp
D
 as the average degree to which either hypothesis 
confirms the negation of the other: 
 
CompD(H,H') = [Cl(H',¬H)+Cl(H,¬H')]/2 = (log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|¬𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|𝐻)
] + log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|¬𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐻′)
]) /2 
 
Next, recall that competition between H and Hʹ occurs along the indirect path, by way 
of some body of evidence E ∈ A, to the extent that these hypotheses undermine the support 
that E provides for each other.  To measure this extent, one must compare the degree to 
which E confirms either hypothesis (without consideration for the other hypothesis) with the 
degree to which E confirms that same hypothesis after the alternative hypothesis is accepted 
or assumed.  For example, E confirms H to degree Cl(E,H); given Hʹ, however, E confirms H 
to degree Cl(E,H|H').  In our previous paper, we defined the extent to which Hʹ turns E 
against H by subtracting the latter from the former: Cl(E,H)-Cl(E,H|H').  Here we use this 
                                                     
3
 Comp lies in the range [-∞,+∞].  For a measure of competition with range [−1,1], one can 
instead opt for measure [C
k
(H,¬H'|E)+Ck(H',¬H|E)]/2, which uses the ordinally equivalent 
“Kemeny-Oppenheim” measure of incremental confirmation: 
Ck(x,y|z) = [Pr(x|y&z)-Pr(x|¬y&z)]/[Pr(x|y&z)+Pr(x|¬y&z)]. 
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approach to define degree of indirect competition Comp
I
as the average degree to which the 
hypotheses turn E against one another: 
 
CompI(H,H'/E) = [Cl(E,H)-Cl(E,H|H')+Cl(E,H')-Cl(E,H'|H)]/2 
= (𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻)
] − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻&𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻&𝐻′)
] + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻′)
]
− 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻′&𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻′&𝐻)
]) /2 
 
The desired result—that Comp captures both pathways to competition—then follows, as 
expressed in the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 1.  Comp(H,H'/E) = Comp
D
(H,H') + Comp
I
(H,H'/E).4 
 
Using our measure, we can make more precise sense of qualitative judgments of 
hypothesis competition.  We explicate the judgment that H and Hʹ compete with respect to E 
(to some degree) as a positive degree of competition, Comp(H,H'/E)>0.  Since positive 
degree of competition corresponds to the case in which H and Hʹ disconfirm one another in 
light of E (and ignoring cases in which Pr(H) or Pr(Hʹ) is zero), we may also state the 
(qualitative) condition for competition using the following probabilistic inequality 
 
Pr(H|Hʹ&E)<Pr(H|E)     (1)  
 
In an earlier study on “explaining away,” Glass (2012, theorem 1) also proved that the 
following inequality provides another equivalent condition for competition: 
 
log [
Pr(E│H&H') ×Pr(E|¬H&¬H')
Pr(E│H&¬H') ×Pr(E|¬H&H')
] +log [
Pr(H|H') ×Pr(¬H|¬H')
Pr(H|¬H') ×Pr(¬H|H')
] < 0 
(2)  
 
We can reapply (2) for our own purposes here, giving us another statement of the criterion 
for competition (to some degree).  (2) turns out to be especially useful insofar as it, unlike the 
                                                     
4
 Proof. [This follows from theorem 1 in Glass and Schupbach (2017).] 
Comp
D
(H,H') + Comp
I
(H,H'/E)    
 = (log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|¬𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻&𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻&𝐻′)
] + log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|¬𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻′&𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻′&𝐻)
]) /2 
 = (log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|¬𝐻) 𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻&𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|𝐻) 𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻&𝐻′)
] + log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|¬𝐻′) 𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻′&𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|¬𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻′)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐻′) 𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻′&𝐻)
]) /2 
 = (log [𝑃𝑟
(𝐻′|¬𝐻&𝐸)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻′|𝐻&𝐸)
] + log [
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|¬𝐻′&𝐸)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐻′&𝐸)
]) /2 = [Cl(H',¬H|E)+Cl(H,¬H'|E)]/2 = Comp(H,H'/E). 
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other qualitative criteria, separates independent terms (the two summands) relating to the 
indirect and direct pathways by which competition can occur respectively.
5
 
Figure 2 displays degree of competition as a function of the likelihoods for the 
hypotheses on their own—i.e. Pr(E|¬H&Hʹ) and Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ)—in a scenario where the 
hypotheses are independent before the evidence is taken into account, corresponding to the 
absence of direct competition as displayed in figure 1(a), and to the case where the second 
term in (2) is zero.  The values of the probabilities Pr(H|E) and Pr(H|Hʹ&E) are also shown in 
the figure.  For the limiting case in which the likelihoods are zero, the first term in (2) is 
infinite and so the degree of competition is minimal.  Essentially, this means that neither 
hypothesis can account for the evidence on its own, since either hypothesis alone (i.e., 
conjoined with the negation of the other hypothesis) implies the falsity of E.  Furthermore, 
when the likelihoods are zero, Pr(H|Hʹ&E) = 1 and so given E, Hʹ guarantees the truth of H.  
As the likelihoods increase, so does the degree of competition until it reaches zero when 
Pr(H|Hʹ&E) = Pr(H|E), which occurs at a value of the likelihood close to 0.25.  This 
corresponds to the first term in (2) being zero.  For greater values of the likelihoods, 
Pr(H|Hʹ&E) < Pr(H|E) and so the degree of competition is positive.  This corresponds to 
competition along pathway 1. 
Figure 3 shows another scenario similar to the previous one, but where there is a 
direct dependence between the hypotheses corresponding to figure 1(b). Negative 
dependence between the hypotheses, which occurs for Pr(Hʹ|H) < 0.1, gives rise to 
competition via pathway 2 and so adds to the competition due to pathway 1. For sufficiently 
large positive dependence the negative contribution via pathway 1 is cancelled out via the 
contribution from pathway 2 resulting in no competition.  This occurs at Pr(Hʹ|H) = 0.3 when 
Pr(H|Hʹ&E) = Pr(H|E) and as the dependence between Hʹ and H increases further the degree 
of competition becomes lower still. 
 
                                                     
5
 That is, if a probabilistic model is specified in terms of the conditional probabilities 
appearing in (2), then the two summands in (2) can be varied independently. 
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Figure 2.  Degree of competition (solid line) as a function of the likelihoods Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ) = 
Pr(E|¬H&Hʹ), when Pr(H) = Pr(Hʹ) = 0.1, Pr(E|H&Hʹ)= 0.8 and Pr(E|¬H&¬Hʹ) = 0.08. Also 
shown are Pr(H|Hʹ&E) (dashed line) and Pr(H|E) (dotted line). Note that here we use an 
ordinally equivalent measure of competition with range [-1,1] (constructed using Ck as 
described in footnote 3). 
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Figure 3. Degree of competition (solid line) as a function of dependence between hypotheses. 
Pr(Hʹ|H) varies from 0 to 1 while Pr(Hʹ|¬H) is fixed at 0.1; thus, dependence is negative for 
Pr(Hʹ|H) < 0.1 and positive for Pr(Hʹ|H)> 0.1. Apart from Pr(Hʹ) other probabilities are as 
defined in figure 2 except that now Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ) and Pr(E|¬H&Hʹ) are fixed at 0.5. Also 
shown are Pr(H|Hʹ&E) (dashed line) and Pr(H|E) (dotted line).  Note that here we use an 
ordinally equivalent measure of competition with range [-1,1] (constructed using Ck as 
described in footnote 3). 
 
 
4. Computer Simulations of Bayesian inference 
In Section 2, we argued that the mutual exclusivity assumption, though common in formal 
philosophy of science research, is often not true to scientific practice (the object of 
philosophy of science research).  At best then, this assumption is a relatively innocuous 
idealizing assumption.  At worst, it perniciously confounds a wide swath of work in 
contemporary philosophy of science.  In this section, we present some initial research into the 
important questions of just how harmful this idealizing assumption can be to formal results, 
and under what conditions. 
In order to investigate the impact of incorrectly assuming that hypotheses are 
mutually exclusive on making inferences, we carried out computer simulations.  The idea is 
first to define a probability model, which we will stipulate as the correct model, Pr, involving 
H, Hʹ and E, where H and Hʹ are not assumed to be mutually exclusive.  We then modify this 
model to obtain what we will call the mutually exclusive probability model, PrX, where H 
and Hʹ are treated as mutually exclusive.  The next step is to make inferences using the 
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mutually exclusive model and determine how good they are by comparing them with 
inferences made using the correct model.  Inferences are made by selecting the most probable 
hypothesis given E, so essentially we evaluate the mutually exclusive model by determining 
how often it identifies the same hypothesis as the correct model—or how often it correctly 
identifies the most probable of potentially competing hypotheses. Here we focus on how the 
results depend on the direct competition between the two hypotheses and so the above steps 
are repeated for different values of direct competition. 
The first step is to define the correct probability model, Pr, for a given degree of 
direct competition between the hypotheses.  Since the measure of direct competition, CompD, 
lies in the range [-,], to obtain a measure with range [−1,1], we instead use the measure 
[C
k
(H,¬H'|E)+Ck(H',¬H|E)]/2, which uses the ordinally equivalent “Kemeny-Oppenheim” 
measure of incremental confirmation, 
Ck(H',¬H) = [Pr(Hʹ|¬H) − Pr(Hʹ|H)]/ [Pr(Hʹ|¬H) + Pr(Hʹ|H)].  For a given value of 
direct competition, d, we can express d as (d1 + d2)/2, where d1 = (b1 - a1)/(b1 + a1), where a1 
= Pr(H|Hʹ) and b1 = Pr(H|¬Hʹ) and d2 = (b2 - a2)/(b2 + a2), where a2 = Pr(Hʹ|H) and b2 = 
P(Hʹ|¬H).  For a positive value of d, (a similar approach is adopted for negative values), d1 
can then be selected randomly from a uniform distribution over the interval (max(2d - 1),0), 
min(2d,1)) and d2 then set to 2d – d1.  Pr(H) is selected randomly.  With Pr(H) fixed, we can 
obtain values for Pr(Hʹ), a1, b1, a2 and b2—since (i) Pr(H) = a1Pr(Hʹ) + b1Pr(¬Hʹ), where b1 = 
a1(1 + d1)/(1 - d1), (ii) there are corresponding expressions for Pr(Hʹ) and b2, and (iii) a1Pr(Hʹ) 
= a2Pr(H).
6
 
As was the case for figure 3, we select values of likelihoods so that Pr(E|¬H&¬Hʹ) < 
min[Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ), Pr(E|¬H&Hʹ)] ≤ max[Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ), Pr(E|¬H&Hʹ)] < Pr(E|H&Hʹ).  Of 
course, other assignments of likelihoods are possible, but this reflects the situation where the 
evidence is more likely if either one of the hypothesis is true rather than if neither is true and 
it is more likely still if both hypotheses are true. It also ensures that both hypotheses are 
confirmed by E, i.e. Pr(H|E) > Pr(H) and Pr(Hʹ|E) > Pr(Hʹ) in the case where H and Hʹ are 
independent. 
Now that the correct probability model has been specified, it needs to be modified to 
obtain the mutually exclusive probability model, PrX.  We define prior probabilities for H and 
Hʹ so that PrX(HvHʹ) = PrX(H) + PrX(Hʹ) = Pr(HvHʹ), which means that the total area of the 
probability space taken up by the hypotheses remains the same.  This is achieved by reducing 
each correct prior Pr(Hi) by multiplying it by the same factor Pr(HvHʹ) / (Pr(H)+Pr(Hʹ)).  
Apart from that, we simply set PrX(E|H) = PrX(E|H&¬Hʹ) = Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ), PrX(E|Hʹ) = 
PrX(E|¬H&Hʹ) = Pr(E|¬H&Hʹ) and PrX(E|¬H&¬Hʹ) = Pr(E|¬H&¬Hʹ). 
                                                     
6
 There are constraints on how Pr(H) is selected to guarantee a coherent probability 
distribution, but this can be implemented simply by selecting Pr(H) from the interval (0,1) 
until the distribution is coherent. The value of Pr(H) does not suffice to determine the value 
of Pr(Hʹ) and hence a2 and b2 in cases where H and Hʹ are independent and so d = d1 = d2 = 0. 
In this case the value of Pr(Hʹ) is also selected randomly from (0,1). 
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With the two models now in place we find the hypothesis that maximizes PrX(Hi|E).  
We compare it with the hypothesis that maximizes Pr(Hi|E) and, if they match, count the 
iteration as a success for the mutually exclusive model.  By repeating this process (10
7
 times 
in the computer simulations that were carried out) of selecting the models and maximizing 
the posterior probability, we are able to determine the accuracy of the mutually exclusive 
approach as the percentage of cases where it is successful.  As noted earlier, this process is 
then repeated for different values of direct competition between H and Hʹ. 
Clearly, when the mutually exclusive approach is used, only one inference can be 
made, but in reality (as described here by the correct model) both hypotheses could be true 
unless the degree of competition is maximal.  To get an idea of how much of a weakness this 
is in the mutually exclusive approach, we also obtained the accuracy by considering the 
number of successes for hypotheses whose posterior probability in the correct model is 
greater than 0.5 as a percentage of the total number of such hypotheses. This can be 
expressed as  
 
Total number of correctly identified hypotheses with probability greater than 0.5
Total number of hypotheses with probability greater than 0.5
 × 100% 
 
where the probability refers to the posterior distribution Pr(|E) of the correct model. 
Results are presented in figure 4.  Consider first of all the results for the general case 
(solid line).  It is clear that as the degree of direct competition approaches its maximal value 
of 1 the accuracy of making inferences using the mutually exclusive model approaches 
100%.  This makes sense since maximal competition corresponds to mutual exclusion.  
While the accuracy of the mutually exclusive approach is greater than 97% for degrees of 
competition above about 0.5, in general the accuracy decreases as degree of direct 
competition decreases and is at 70% for values close to -1, which corresponds to the case 
where the hypotheses, far from competing, entail each other.  While this seems like a 
reasonable level of accuracy, it must be remembered that there are only two hypotheses to 
choose from and so a random guess would achieve an accuracy of 50%.  Note that a degree 
of competition of 0.5 corresponds to cases in which each hypothesis is on average still three 
times as likely to be true if the alternative hypothesis is false, Pr(Hi|¬Hj) = 3 ×Pr(Hi|Hj) 
while a degree of direct competition of 1/3 corresponds to the case where each is on average 
still twice as likely.  In such cases, there remains a substantial relation of negative relevance 
between the hypotheses, and thus reasoners may still be strongly inclined to think of them as 
competitors.
7
   
                                                     
7
 Note that for both sets of results in figure 4 the results for a zero degree of competition are 
higher than the general trend might suggest, which is presumably related to the fact that there 
is an independence relationship present in this case that is absent in the other cases. Because 
of this independence the probability distribution had to be selected in a different way in this 
case as mentioned in footnote 6. 
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Figure 4.  Accuracy of inferences made using the mutually exclusive model as a function of 
the degree of direct competition between the hypotheses. Results are presented for the 
general case (solid line) and for the case where all hypotheses with a posterior probability 
greater than 0.5 are taken into account in determining accuracy (dashed line).   
 
 Now consider the results that take into account cases where both hypotheses H and Hʹ 
have a posterior probability greater than 0.5 according to the correct model (dashed line in 
figure 4).  When the degree of competition is 1 the hypotheses cannot both have probability 
greater than 0.5, i.e. they cannot both be more likely to be true than false.  Hence for high 
degrees of competition, the accuracy is still close to 100%.  However, the accuracy now falls 
off much more quickly so that it is already below 75% when the degree of competition is 0.3. 
In general, the accuracy continues to fall with lower values of competition until it reaches an 
accuracy of just 35% as the degree of competition approaches -1.  Of course, it is not 
surprising that the mutually exclusive approach performs worse in this case since according 
to it at most one hypothesis could be true (or have probability greater than 0.5).  These results 
highlight the extent of perhaps the most significant problem with the mutually exclusive 
approach: its exclusion of hypotheses that may well be true. 
In summary, insofar as inference is concerned with identifying the most probable 
hypothesis, it could be argued from the results in figure 4 that the mutually exclusive 
approach performs quite well, with an accuracy close to or greater than 90%, provided the 
hypotheses are in direct competition to at least some extent, i.e. the degree of direct 
competition is greater than zero.  However, the problem of excluding hypotheses that may 
well be true is a problem even in cases where the hypotheses are competing.  Of course, all of 
these results provide insight into cases where we are only monitoring varying degrees of 
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direct competition; future investigations will explore the extent to which these inaccuracies 
might be compounded when we instead consider cases of varying degrees of indirect and/or 
net competition. 
 
 
5. Case Study 
Let us return to our earlier discussion of consistent but competing scientific hypotheses in the 
context of the mass extinction at the K-Pg boundary. Here we focus on two of the causal 
hypotheses, asteroid impact and Deccan volcanism, which we denote as H and Hʹ 
respectively. There is no reason to think that these hypotheses are mutually exclusive. While 
there is no competition along the direct pathway 2, there may be competition along the 
indirect pathway 1. If so, the discovery of evidence that provides confirmation of the impact 
hypothesis, as noted earlier, would count against volcanism via pathway 1 even if this 
evidence does not directly contradict volcanism. This is the main strategy adopted by Schulte 
et al. (2010) who, assuming competition between the hypotheses, argue against volcanism 
essentially on the grounds that it is not needed because the asteroid hypothesis on its own 
accounts for the relevant evidence. 
Some responses to Schulte et al. suggest that the impact and volcanism hypotheses 
are not in competition (Archibald et al. 2010; Courtillot and Fluteau 2010; Keller et al. 2010). 
Their arguments, as well as other work (Brusatte 2015), which relate to the first term in 
expression (2) and hence to pathway 1, amount to the claim that overall the evidence given 
both impact and volcanism hypotheses (and perhaps other hypotheses too) is much more 
probable than it is given the impact hypothesis without volcanism, i.e. Pr(E|H&Hʹ) is much 
greater than Pr(E|H&¬Hʹ).  In a recent paper, Renne et al. (2015) argue that the Chicxulub 
impact accelerated the rate of volcanic activity from the Deccan Traps. This kind of direct 
positive dependence between the hypotheses would result in a positive second term in (2) and 
would lead to support between the hypotheses rather than competition along pathway 2. 
This very brief survey indicates that there are grounds for questioning the assumption 
that the impact and volcanic hypotheses are competing. Furthermore, even if the hypotheses 
are competing to some degree, the simulation results presented in section 4 show that if the 
assumption of mutual exclusion is made for inference purposes it could easily lead to 
exclusion of a true hypothesis. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have argued that hypothesis competition cannot be adequately understood in terms of 
mutual exclusion. It is important to recognize that competition is a matter of degree and that 
it can occur in different ways – directly or indirectly via the evidence. In Section 3, we 
defended a previously proposed measure by showing how it explicates these features in terms 
of degrees of direct and indirect competition and by illustrating its quantitative behavior in 
simple scenarios. It might be thought that mutual exclusivity would suffice as a simplifying 
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assumption that would capture key aspects of scientific reasoning, but the results of computer 
simulations in Section 4 show that this approach can have significant limitations, particularly 
resulting in the exclusion of hypotheses that may well be true. Finally, our brief discussion of 
the extinction of the dinosaurs in Section 5 illustrates subtleties of competition in scientific 
practice that go well beyond mutual exclusion. This work suggests that there is a need for 
philosophers of science to explore the nature of hypothesis competition in more detail and we 
hope that our account provides a helpful framework for this task. 
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